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One of the distinctive legal developments of this century has been
the wide use of systems of civil restraint as alternatives to the penal
system of social defense. While purely preventive detention has been
openly used in the shocking wartime detention of persons of Japanese
ancestry' and remains a threat to persons regarded by the Government
as "security risks,"2 civil restraints are more commonly applied under
the often fictional guise of curative treatment in the civil commitment
of the mentally ill,3 juveniles,4 sexual deviants, narcotic addicts,0 and
the mentally retarded.7 Despite the pervasive use of such forms of
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1. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 220 U.S. 81 (1943); see Rostow, The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813 (1964). The quotation is from the heading of 50 U.S.C., ch. 23,Subchapter II, "Emergency Detention of Suspected Security Risks." The statutory basis for
detention is an executive finding, subject to administrative review, that "there is reasonable
ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire ith
others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage." 50 U.S.C. § 813. 50 U.S.C. § 819(h)(3)(1964) provides that in determining such probability the Attorney General, preliminary
hearing officer and Board of Detention Review are authorized to consider, among other
things, evidence of ".. . the holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in,
the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party
which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United
States ." The statute does not state whether membership alone is suffident by itself
to establish the necessary probability for detention. Of course there are substantial ques-
tions of the constitutionality of these provisions.
3. See the recent landmark study, Projects, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 822 (1967); see also T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBErTY, AND PsYcuamIv (1963); F.
L iNA & D. MclNrmx, TnE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw (1961; Kadish, A Case
Study in The Signification of Procedural Due Process-InslitudonaliZlng The Mentally
I1, 9 IW. POL. Q. 93 (1956); Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13
KAN. L. REv. 59 (1964).
4. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (196).
5. F. LINDmAN s & D. McINTYRE, supra note 3, at 298-312; Note, The Plight of the Sexual
Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 Nomna D sm LAw. 527(1966); Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summar and Analysis, 51 J. CR. LC.
& P.S. 215 (1960); Cohen, Administration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute in
Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 450 (1957); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offendcr 19 FE.
PROB., June 1955, at 7; Cf. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
6. Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 405 (1967);
Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1160 (1967); cf. Frankel,
Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment, 1966 UTAHr L. REv.
581.
7. F. IxmwAN & D. MCINra, supra note 3, at 298-99. Gordon & Harris, On Irvestiga.
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restraint, until recently there has been little comment on their legality
as such," and no adequate standards have been developed to restrict
their use. Only recently, in fact, has any effort been made to distin-
guish curative from preventive rationales for civil restraints and to
face the difficult questions raised by the civil detention of persons who
cannot benefit from treatment, but who are nevertheless dangerous to
others when free. The universal curative mask applied by legislators
and accepted by the courts in dealing with civil restraints has obscured
the legal issues which must be faced if individual liberty is to be pro-
tected and effective treatment provided.
Civil restraint, both for purposes of treatment and for purposes of
detaining persons who are untreatable but dangerous, seems likely to
be increasingly used in the future. Our society is developing sophisti-
cated means of measuring deviance and detecting, even when it cannot
cure, dangerous propensities.' 0 It seems unlikely that we will be able
to resist the temptation to put this knowledge to work in the interest
of community security, through the isolation of the deviant and dan-
gerous. If it is utopian to dream of total prevention of crime through
scientific identification and isolation of crime-prone persons before
they commit offenses, a system incorporating these goals is no longer
impossibly remote. In any event, we are developing institutions which
often operate as if, in their domains, utopia has been achieved.
tion and Critique of the Defective Delinquent Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. Rv. 459
(1950); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Director of Patuxent Institution
v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
8. Morris, Psychiatry and The Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514 (1968):
Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and The Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87
(1967); Dershowitz, The Role of Law in the Prediction and Prevention of Harmful
Conduct, unpublished paper printed in part in J. KAZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 558 (1967) fhereinafter cited as KATz, GOLDSTEIN
: DEaSnOWrrz]; Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment"-Elaborating The Processes
of Decision in Sanctioning Systems of the Criminal Law, 44 DENVER L.J. 163 (1967); Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 995, 1125, 1165-75
(1965); Katz & Goldstein, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, 131 J. NERv. & MENTAL
DISEASE, 404 (1960).
But see Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and The Right to Treatment, 77 YALE
L.J. 87, 107-16 (1967); Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary
Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CH. L. RFv. 633, 642-60 (1967); Aronowltz, Civl
Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 424-29 (1967); Note, The Nascent
Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1137-43, 1155-59 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966); Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). See generally Hearings on Constitutional
Rights of The Mentally Ill before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 (1961).
9. Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1160, 1168 (1967); Note,
Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 96 (1967).
10. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECrIONS 20-22 (1967). Cf. Morris, supra note 8, at 531-36. See also
Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1962).
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When the pursuit of utopia entails prolonged or even permanent
deprivation of personal liberty, however, the constitutional issues in-
volved cannot be ignored. If individual losses of freedom are to be
justified by gains in collective security, it is time to analyze the processes
for determining these gains and losses and, indeed, to consider whether
such calculations are constitutionally permitted at all."
The gain to society from detention of dangerously deviant persons
is obvious although difficult to evaluate: in each case it will depend
upon some combination of the severity of the harm prevented and the
probability of its occurrence, absent detention. The loss to the indi-
viduals involved is equally clear: apart from the deprivation of control
over one's daily movements and affairs that is a necessary consequence
of detention as such, there are in addition the loss of dignity and
respect attaching to incarceration under whatever name, and the dis-
comfort of life in understaffed, underequipped and barrenly respressive
institutions.
In weighing the social gains and costs of preventive detention, it is
all too easy, in our desire to protect society, to forget that there is a
powerful countervailing interest, shared by all of us, in the protection
of the freedom and dignity of each of us. As a practical matter our own
liberty and dignity are threatened if the liberty of others is too cheaply
valued. The next man to be deprived of liberty may be one of us. -
Thus limitations on the vulnerability of the individual to restrictive
sanctions are important to the security of us all.
But beyond the practical threat to all individuals if personal liberty
may too easily be taken is the danger of weakening basic psychological
and ideological commitments. Our need to establish a sense of personal
dignity and autonomy in order to think and act as responsible indi-
viduals suggests that as a society we must commit ourselves to minimiz-
11. Given the primacy of personal liberty as a value in our socicty, a respectable argu-
ment can be made that preventive detention can never be justified where the person to
be detained has not consented to his detention, will not benefit from it, and has not by
prior blameworthy conduct merited detention as punidunent. I find this contention vcry
appealing on a priori grounds.
Nevertheless , I am forced to conclude that a complete constitutional bar to preventive
detention should not be erected. Once it becomes possible to predict with substantial
accuracy that someone constitutes a danger to the lives of others if he is allowed to remain
free, I am not prepared to assert that he has in all cases an absolute right to freedom
until he kills or tries to kill his first victim. The individuals composing our society are
entitled to protection from dangers which can be prevented without too great a sodal cost.
Fruitful evaluation of the price for such protection can only be made after consideration
of remedies and procedures capable of minimizing the threat to personal liberty inherent
in any preventive detention.
12. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 819, 857-58 (1957).
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ing the circumstances and conditions which will result in the organized
deprivation of liberty and personal dignity of others--even where such
deprivation is a means of protecting society or accomplishing therapy.
This does not mean that individual autonomy or personal status are
absolute values which cannot be curtailed when it is necessary to do so.
But in developing rules for the governmental use of deprivations of
liberty and status to achieve protection of the public or the improve-
ment of the person so deprived, it is imperative that the rules authoriz-
ing deprivation be limited and conditioned as much as possible by
principles vindicating our practical and ideological need for and com-
mitment to the values of human liberty and human dignity. If protec-
tion of others from more serious harms requires us to restrain some
persons and treat others by therapies they do not want, we must have
means to limit such deprivations and, just as important, to insure that
decisions to impose such deprivations are not made arbitrarily or for
less than adequate reasons. The imposition of governmental restraints
and involuntary treatment must not only be subject to limitations, but
the limitations must be rational and in accordance with principles
which are ideologically consistent with our society's adherence to no-
tions of human liberty and the value of the human personality. Only
by such limitations can we minimize the affront to our ideology implicit
in the notion that some men cannot be allowed to retain the liberty or
preserve the personal dignity that the rest of us hold so dear.1
Public concern with crime problems, greater public acceptance of
psychiatric theory, wider dispersion of basic knowledge about psychia-
tric typology among laymen in welfare agencies, courts, schools and
other public bodies, increasing exposure of individuals to psychological
testing, and the increased use of computers in records retention and
information retrieval, all point in the direction of greater visibility of
persons regarded as socially and psychologically deviant. As deviance
becomes more visible, the public demand for preventive action against
deviants may be expected to increase even though it remains impossible
to predict which persons in the identifiably deviant group are actually
13. Elsewhere I have referred to this ideological value as the moral-libertarian prin-
ciple that punishment must be morally legitimate.[T]he sanctions or restraints to which [an individual] is subjected must be so condi.
tioned that it would not be irrational for him to agree to their propriety.[T]he application of criminal sanctions can be legitimate in our society only where,in theory, it would be possible for those invoking the sanction process to say: 'WOknow this is going to be unpleasant, but if you were rational and objective about this,you would concur that you deserve it and therefore it is just,"
Frankel, supra note 6, at 592.
282
Vol, 78: 229, 1968
Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation
going to commit harmful acts. In the face of such a trend the best hope
for a judicial rule which will operate to protect personal liberty seems
to lie not in outright prohibition of preventive detention as such, but
in the development of narrower judicial doctrines capable of restrict-
ing and limiting legislative resort to preventive detention.
I. The Civil-Penal Distinction and a Unitary Preventive
Correctional System
In developing the rational and principled limitations which should
determine the proper balance between individual liberty and collective
security, it is logical to begin with the lessons of past experience. Our
law has long been concerned with the development of such a balance.
Of course the pre-eminent body of legal precedent for charting the
course of this development has for centuries been the criminal law
and, more recently, cases interpreting the federal Bill of Rights. It is
for this reason that, in attempting to prescribe standards for the future
development of civil restraints, we must necessarily fall back upon past
experience with this related body of law.
Traditional learning, however, distinguishes sharply between civil
and penal sanctions and the procedures by which they are imposed.14
Judicial solicitude for the substantive and procedural rights of criminal
defendants is matched only by the ease with which courts are able to
dispense with similar requirements in cases involving civil proceedings.
If limiting principles applicable to civil restraints are to be adopted
from the criminal sphere, the traditional gulf between criminal and
civil proceedings must first be bridged.15
14. The claim that involuntary commitments are penal rather than civil usually arims
in the context of obections to the denial of procedural rights afforded in a criminal prose-
cution. The older cases tend to reject such daims by conduding that the proceedings are
civil rather than penal. Examples from the sexual psychopath cases are MiIle v. Over-
holser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460. 311 P.2d 897
(1957). Similar statements are found in more recent cases as well. People v. Loignon,
250 Cal. App. 2d 386, 58 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1967); Wise v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 1
Md. App. 418, 230 A.2d 692 (1967); State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133 N.W.2d 583 (1965).
Until the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), similar statements
were made with regard to juvenile court proceedings. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d
523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955), Morton v. Hayden, 154 Me. 6, 142 A.2d 37
(1958); Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963); In re Johnson, 227 Cal. App.
2d 37, 38 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1964). For a narcotic commitment case rejecting the applicabiFity
of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition see In re De La 0, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489,
378 P.2d 793 (1963).
For recent cases applying more stringent procedural requirements see notes 15 and 24
infra.
15. "These commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are sub-
ject both to the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and to the
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Despite the solemnity with which courts have purported to differ-
entiate the two, any attempt to articulate the distinction is likely to
result in tautology or in a semantic and conceptualistic formula un-
related either to the situation of the person subjected to the process
in question or the public policies which are reflected in the attempt to
make the distinction. In the most obvious sense there is no difference
at all between civil and penal sanctions: the consequence for the person
affected is involuntary confinement in a state institution subject to
physical restraint, discipline by force, and the denial of relatively
simple privileges and autonomy. That a warder may wear a uniform of
a different color than a guard's is hardly significant. 10 Nor is the pur-
pose of the confinement a differentiating factor sufficient to justify
material differences in the procedures by which the decision to incar-
cerate is made. Whether the deprivation of liberty be justified pri-
marily as punishment, as a necessary condition of treatment, or as the
means for preventing future dangerously deviant behavior, it inevitably
involves some mix of punitive, restorative and preventive motives.17
Due Process Clause. We hold that the requirements of due process were not satisfied here."Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967). The case struck down a commitment under
the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 et seq. (1963), becausedefendant could be committed for an indeterminate term following conviction on tilebasis of a psychiatric report, without a hearing and without the right to confront the
expert witnesses. The Court concluded that the procedure involved was criminal. See alsoUnited States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). A tendency of
recent cases has been to impose more stringent procedural requirements in civil commit.
ment proceedings and in the process to minimize the significance of the civil-penal distinc-
tion. Most noteworthy is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.541 (1966). Illinois has held that in proceedings under the Illinois Sexually DangerousPersons Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 105-1.01 et seq. (1964), the defendant must be ac-
corded the same procedural safeguards available to an accused in a criminal trial thoughthe proceedings are "civil" in nature. People v. Olmstead, 32 111. 2d 306, 309, 205 N.E.2d625, 627 (1965). New York has held that an indigent mental patient, challenging his de-tention by habeas corpus, is entitled to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitu-
tional right, People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966). ItiHeryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968), the court held that a person committed
to a state training school for the feeble-minded had a constitutional right to counsel at
the commitment proceedings.
16. "Incarceration, whether called hospitalization or by other euphemism means de-priving a person of liberty. No matter how sweetly disguised or delicate the language,involuntary confinement is a loss of freedom." In re Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912, 171 N.Y.S.2d875, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1957); People ex rel. Goldfinger v. Johnston, 53 Misc. 2d 949, 280 N.Y.S.2d
304, 306 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
17. "It would be archaic to limit the definition of punishment to 'retribution.' Punish.
ment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One ofthe reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting
future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment." UnitedStates v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). See F. ALLEN, TnE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUS-TICE 25-41 (1962); Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. Ci. L. REv. 627, 637.44(1966).
M ..Tlhe sick role is also an institutionalized role, which shares certain character-istics with that of criminality but also involves certain very important differences.Instead of an almost absolute illegitimacy, the sick role involves a relative legitimacy,
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Is it then the place or conditions of incarceration, the intent of the
legislature or adjudicating officials, or some imputed public attitude
or understanding that is supposed to distinguish civil from penal
detention? More than one court has held that civil detention can be
served in the state prison and still be civil.18 The legislative intent for
any involuntary commitment statute, moreover, is likely to be ambiva-
lent, reflecting varying proportions of punitive, restorative and pre-
ventive purposes. As for the motives of prosecutor, judge and jury,
these would seem to be irrelevant, so long as their actions are within
the bounds of discretion accorded them by law. Finally any attitude
or understanding imputed to the public is too inchoate and uncertain
to serve as a basis for meaningful judgments on the civil or penal
nature of a statute. It seems clear that the characterization of a given
proceeding to deprive a deviant individual of his freedom as either
"civil" or "penal" is conclusionary rather than analytical and cannot
that is so long as there is an implied "agreement" to "pay the price" in accepting
certain disabilities and the obligation to get well.
T. PARsoNs, THE SocAL SYs'at (1951); quoted in R. DONNELLY, J. GoSTM & R.
ScmvA m-z, CRIMINAL LAw 505 (1962) [hereinafter cited as DONNELLY, Go srEIN &
SCHvARTZ]. Cf. T. SZASZ, supra note 3, at 24, 18-22. See also note 14 supra.
18. People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897, 902 (1957).
The emphasis that appellant places on the fact that he was originally convicted of a
misdemeanor and now finds himself in San Quentin, possibly for life, is misplaced.
This argument would be sound only were his confinement punishment. As we have
already seen, the purpose of the confinement is to protect society and to try and cure
the accused.
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1967), the Court pointed out that "Oin about one-
half of the States, a juvenile may be transferred to an adult penal institution after ajuvenile court has found him delinquent" citing DELrNQuENT CHiLDREN iN PENAL INsm-
TIONS (Children's Bureau Pub. No. 415, 1964).
A graphic instance of a civilly committed person finding himself in prison as a method
of "treatment" is presented by In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 NAV.2d 470 (1958). Mad-
dox, committed as a sexual psychopath, was transferred to the state prison because he ims
adamant in denying that he had committed the acts charged to him as the basis for his
commitment. The Michigan Court ruled that imprisonment in the state prison uas not
an available prescription for civil treatment. See also note 24 infra.
In a case posing similar issues, the California Supreme Court upheld confinement in a
state penal institution, unsegregated from convicted felons, for a narcotic addict who had
consented to civil commitment. In re Cruz, 62 Cal. 2d 307, 398 P.2d 412, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1965). Cruz, originally confined at the California Rehabilitation Center, was transferred
to a penal institution for repeated violation of institutional rules, failure "to internalize
controls and to function in the atmosphere of California Rehabilitation Center." The
transfer to the penal institution was to be until he "shows the ability to handle respon-
sibility and has learned to internalize controls." 62 Cal. 2d at 316, 398 P.2d at 417, 42 Cal.
Rptr. at 225. While, presumably, a person who could handle responsibility and had
internalized controls would not need commitment as an addict at all, the court sustained
the transfer, noting that Cruz continued to receive treatment in the form of weekly par-
ticipation in group counseling sessions, academic and vocational training plus regular
work assignments and recreational and religious facilities (probably not very different
from the treatment convicted felons received). The court noted that a total of 113 men
had been transferred from the rehabilitation center to the penal institution as of October
1964, some two years after the civil program had commenced operation. 62 Cal. 2d at 316
n.6, 398 P.2d at 418 n.6, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.6. Nevertheless, the court approved of the
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meaningfully be used to justify differences in the constitutional stand-
ards applied.19
Professor Glanville Williams has defined a crime as "an act capable
of being followed by criminal proceedings having a criminal out-
come. " 20 The obvious tautology of this definition should not blind us
to its real utility. When we distinguish crimes from non-crimes, we are
really talking about whether the legal proceedings must follow certain
historically developed rules for the purpose of determining whether
certain traditional, ritualistic consequences may attach. Whether a
process is civil or criminal is really a kind of pseudo-question, a shadow
of the real questions: (1) Are the procedures for determining the issue
to be decided consistent with the historically developed patterns for
litigation in which state power is painfully focused on an individual?
(2) Are the consequences resulting from a finding against the re-
spondent fair and appropriate given the historical limitations on the
power of the state to curtail the liberty and diminish the dignity of
individuals?
If these questions are the essence of the pseudo-question of civil or
penal proceeding, then one approach the courts can apply in resolving
the issue of whether a sanction is civil or penal is to weigh all the
characteristics of the statutory program in question, considering the
legislative characterization, the purposes of the proceedings, and most
important, its effects on persons subject to it, including the dispositions
practice since the need to minimize the external indicia of criminality in the Rehablllta.tion Center required in part that it be a minimum security institution. This In turnjustified the practice of casting out rebellious and uncooperative inmates, by transferring
them to the penal institution.
19. Outstanding examples of the shortcomings of the traditional civil-penal dichotomy
and of the problems caused by those shortcomings are provided by the Instructive cases
of bail and pre-trial detention of material witnesses. In both instances the accepted ratio.nale for detention is neither punishment nor detention for therapeutic treatment, but
rather the need to insure the presence of the detainee at trial. For an excellent discussionof the confused state of the theory of bail, of resulting abuses, and of the social and con-stitutional issues involved in the tangled threads of prevention of flight and protection of
society, see Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV, L. Rtv. 1489 (1960).While the bail system has recently been receiving attention, almost no concern has been
shown for the outrageous use of detention of material witnesses. Nothing more than the
convenience of the state can justify this practice, and yet witnesses have been deprived oftheir liberty for as much as five months under currently operative statutes. See Quince v.Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349 (1959); Barber v. Moss, 3 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d 838(1955). Falling somewhere outside the civil-penal dichotomy, detention of material wit-
nesses is a low-visibility instance of deprivation of liberty to which neither civil nor penallimitations naturally apply. So long as the issues involved in all cases of detention arethought of in terms of these traditional poles, rather than as varying forms of deprivations
of personal liberty, it will be difficult to evolve effective principles of limitation generally
applicable to these ambiguous kinds of detention.
20. Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CuRENT L. PROB. 107, 123 (1955), in DoN-
NELLY, GOLDSTEIN 8- SCHWATrz 267-68.
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to be made, the restraints on the person, and the effects on his status
in the community.21 Such an approach must lead to recognition that
there are not two categories-civil and penal-but a broad spectrum
of procedures manifesting characteristics traditionally penal or civil
in varying degrees.
The recognition that the concepts of penal and civil proceedings are
not discrete categories but characterizations of points on a spectrum
should lead the courts to the next step, in which the civil and penal
labels are discarded as not determinative. Instead, the courts should
look at what is being done to the subject of the proceeding and why it
is being done. The great proliferation of involuntary disposition and
treatment statutes, the steady mitigation of the extremes of criminal
punishment, the substitution of rehabilitative goals for vindictive treat-
ment all tend to make civil and criminal proceedings more alike. But
this is not to suggest that the historical restrictions on the criminal pro-
cesses will be discarded. On the contrary, these restrictions should be
seen not as historical accidents, but rather as necessary and appropriate
limitations on state power, imposed to insure the accuracy of the fact-
determining process and to preserve the dignity of the individual sub-
jected to an uneven contest against the state. If these historical limita-
tions have their own logic, we can expect that, with time, this logic will
find increased expression in the judicial evaluation of all proceedings in
which the power of the state is applied to an individual against his
will for the purpose of imposing restraints on his liberty. Certainly
this seems to be the trend of recent decisions.a Most notable, perhaps,
is the Supreme Court's recent refusal to allow the myth of parens
patriae to obscure the need for procedural regularity and safeguards
as a matter of constitutional due process in juvenile court proceed-
ings.23 But other courts have also begun to apply rigorous standards
of procedural due process to other civil detention statutes.24
21. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965).
22. See cases cited note 15 supra.
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or
whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a
crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency or treatment and training as a
feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the constitu-
tional safeguards of due process.
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (due process requires counsel at
proceedings to commit a person to a training school for the feeble minded).
Compare In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897), and In re LeDonne, 173
Mass. 550, 54 N.E. 244 (1899), with In re Rohrer, 230 N.E.2d 915 (Sup. Jud. C. Mass. 1957).
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In spite of such progress, until such time as the law has developed to
the point at which there are no procedurally significant consequences
to the characterization of a program as penal or civil, courts will still
feel compelled to engage in such characterization. The immediate
judicial approach is likely to be that of treating civilness and penality
as matters of degree. But the thrust must be toward minimizing the
practical differences-both substantive and procedural-held to flow
from the conceptual distinction. Thus even where a statutory program
is found to be primarily curative or preventive in approach, any aspects
of the program which are unduly harsh or painful to the subject of
the proceedings, either intrinsically or in relation to the aims to be
accomplished by the statute, should not withstand judicial evaluation.20-
One would hope, for example, that sterilization, 20 prefrontal lobot-
omy,27 and castration 2 are no longer constitutionally available prescrip-
The Appellate Court of Illinois has held that the defendant in a sexually-dangerous.
person proceeding is entitled to the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
including the appointment of counsel and warning of his privilege against self-incrimnina-
tion before undergoing psychiatric examination. People v. Potter, 85 111. App. 2d 151, 228
N.E.2d 238 (1967). See also cases cited note 15 supra.
25. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958) (one "civilly" committed pur-
suant to a sexual psychopath law may not be transferred for treatment to the state prison);
White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954) (a juvenile detained under a juvenile court
act cannot be kept in the District of Columbia jail). But see note 18 supra.
26. Mickde v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918), and Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D.
Iowa 1914), held that vasectomy as punishment for crime was cruel and unusual punish-
ment. A countrary result was reached in State v. Feilin, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912). Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upheld the validity of a state statute authorizing sterilization
as a legitimate exercise of the police power. But cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535(1942), holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute authorizing sterilization of persons
convicted two or more times of crimes involving moral turpitude. The Court concluded
that the statutory standard for persons subject to sterilization violated the equal protec-
tion of the law. Sterilization is still used in some states. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206(P. Ct. Zanesville County, Ohio 1962) (permitting sterilization of 18 year.old rctarded
girl); Note, Eugenic Sterilization in Indiana, 38 IND. L.J. 275 (1963). In his concurrence
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965), Justice White cited the Skinner case
for the proposition that ". . . the liberty entitled to protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . .
and that these are among 'the basic civil rights of man' . . ." It seems to me that the
constitutionality of involuntary sterilization for eugenic purposes is ripe for further judi-
cial testing.
27. Psychosurgery has been carried out on probably some 30,000 mentally ill persons
in the United States. Although considered a magic remedy at one time, now it is being
used less and less-partly because new drugs are making patients more manageablc
and partly because many doctors question the wisdom and even the morality of
psychosurgery. One form of the operation, prefrontal lobotomy, has caused some
patients to become apathetic and unconcerned with life and activity. Some observers
have described them as "vegetables" ...
F. LINDMAN & D. MclNTYRE, supra note 3, at 148.
28. Cf. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), in which the court equated vasec-
tomy with castration in purpose and in humiliation of the person compelled to submit
to such an operation. Castration seems never to have been used as a punishment in Amer.
ican law and to have disappeared from English law after the revolution of 1688. Id. at 417.
R. SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 104 (1965), reports that castration is autho-
rized in Sweden and Finland for some offenses.
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tions for the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill, the mentally
retarded, and the sexually deviant and dangerous. Such treatments are
no less an affront to the dignity of the human personality when applied
civilly than when imposed as criminal penalties.2 It is no great recon-
struction of the past to conclude that when the founding fathers
prohibited the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, they in-
tended to prohibit as well the imposition of similar treatment upon
those who had committed no crime.30 Here, too, the logic of history
suggests that the law's restraints on legislative power over wrongdoers
requires the development of parallel restrictions on legislative power
over those who cannot be blamed for what they are. The point which
needs emphasis however is not the barbarism of lobotomy or steriliza-
tion but the process of historical analogy which gives that value judg-
ment a constitutional dimension.
The most obvious lesson of the penal law analogy is the need for
stringent standards of procedural due process. Obviously a fair and
adequate factual determination of the issue of the respondent's status
as a committable person must be provided. Personal liberty and indi-
vidual dignity are too precious to be confiscated by mistake. Accord-
ingly, the individual should be entitled to notice and hearing, the
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him and to call his own witnesses, and the right to a
decision by a fair and impartial tribunal on objectively reviewable
evidence. 31 Further, evidentiary restrictions requiring that evidence
29. The Commander told us that he had three boys who needed to be punished.
They had been talking in the dining hall. He called out their names. The boys came
up, stood at the platform, held on with their hands and bent over, and the Com-
mander took a paddle that was about a yard long and struck each of them three very
hefty blows. All of the boys in the place stopped and watched raler sullenly, and I
kind of flinched with each blow. The boy who was being punished, however, kept
absolutely quiet and firm, and when the blow was over, he malked off as dignified as
he could ....
D. STxrET, R. VINTER & C. PERROW, ORGANIMXION FOR TREATMrENT 156 (1966l). This work
reports a study of the aims, organization, and administration of selected juvenile detention
centers which cover a spectrum from primarily custodial to primarily therapeutic in struc-
ture and approach. Such distinctions are reflected in a number of factors: the aims 
and
personalities of the administrators, the resources and facilities available, community atti-
tudes and the traditions of the institution itself. Even a program clearly intended to be
dvil seems likely, however, to develop significantly punitive and custodial aspects. The
need to handle large numbers of people with a small number of staff assures some de-
personalization of the inmate. E. GoFF:MAN, ASYLU.MS. 5-12 (1961). Given this tendency of
custodial and therapeutic detention to develop punitive aspects, judicial review of the
administrative practices of such institutions seems to be necessary and desirable.
0. Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); Note, Te Effectiveness of the
Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
846, 854-57 (1961).
31. "Due process ...requires that [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an
opportunity to be heard, be confronted with the witnesses against him, have the right to
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be relevant and probative should also be required.82 And, of course, the
most important evidentiary rules, those relating to the burden of pre-
senting an issue and persuading the trier of fact, would seem to be
required in non-penal proceedings for detention since they too serve toprevent factually erroneous judgments. While proof "beyond a reason-
able doubt" may not be required in all civil commitment proceedings"
clearly the respondent in any such proceeding should not be commit-table on a bare probability that he is within a detainable category. 04Such procedural requirements seem necessary to the accuracy of anyjudicial process of fact finding, and there is reason to believe that the
courts will in time quite generally require them.80 The danger is thatthe courts may fail to recognize that, in civil commitment proceedings,procedural due process is not enough. What must be done is to develop
substantive restrictions on legislative power to provide for restraint ofindividuals thought by the legislature to be dangerous. In developing
such restraints the courts must look primarily to the lessons learnedfrom the long history of the struggle to invest the human personality
with safeguards against mistaken, arbitrary and unjust applications
of state power. As these lessons are applied, the conceptual labels
cross-examine and to offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate tomake meaningful any appeal that is allowed." Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1067)(involving the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which the Court categorized as penal aftcr astrong hint that such categorization was not determinative); see note 15 supra. In In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967), the Court declined to pass upon the question of whether aright to appeal was required as a matter of due process.32. Cf. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 743 (Wyo. 1965).33. Cf. In re Whittington 
- U.S. -, 88 S. Ct. 1507 (1968), remanding to the statecourt, for consideration of the impact of the Gault decision, a case in which petltloner,a juvenile, claimed among other things that an improper standard of proof had been usedin making the determination that he was a delinquent. Compare In re Urbasek, 38 I11. 2d535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968), and United States v. Costanzo, - F.2d -, 3 CiRm. L. Ra. 2142(4th Cir. 1968), with United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957). In reWhittington, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333 (1967). or a suggestion that proof be-yond a reasonable doubt should be required in all civil confinement proceedings, see Note,Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YA.E L.J. 1160, 1181-82 (1967).34. Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commit.ment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 633, 654-56 (1967). While it might seem that psy-chiatric or other expert examinations and reports are sufficient to assure the accuracy ofjudgments to commit, see Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirementsof Due Process, 21 O11o ST. L.J. 28, 50 (1960). A recent empirical study indicates that suchexperts may premise their reports on a "presumption of insanity." Scheff, The SocietalReaction to Deviance: Ascriptive Elements in the Psychiatric Screening of Mental Patientsin a Midwestern State, in S. SPi'zER & N. DENZIN, THE MENTAL PATIENT: STUDIES IN TIlESOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 276 (1968). See also Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Com-mitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 383 (1962). See also Dershowitz, Psychiatry in theLegal Process: "A Knife that Cuts Both Ways," 51 JolCATUaR 870, 77 (1968): "[I]t seemsthat psychatrists are particularly prone to one type of error-overprediction. In otherwords, they tend to predict anti-social conduct in many instances where it would not, Infact, occur. Indeed, our research suggests that for every correct psychiatric prediction ofviolence, there are numerous erroneous predictions."35. See cases cited in notes 15 and 24 supra.
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"penal" and "civil" will become outmoded, and we shall reach a point
at which the law is concerned only with the appropriateness of the
restraint and the procedural adequacy and fairness of the proceeding.
The most perplexing task facing the courts in the evaluation and
application of civil detention statutes will be the development of stan-
dards for making and reviewing determinations of committability. The
problem must be faced on two levels: the application of statutory
standards for commitment to particular individuals, and review of the
appropriateness of the standards and criteria fixed by the legislature.
The judicial task of determining whether an individual falls within
a statutorily defined category of committable persons will largely de-
pend upon the criteria of committability adopted by the legislature.
Assuming a case in which the legislature adopts dangerousness in some
form as the standard for committability, it seems clear that the courts
will be faced with an extremely difficult task. The nature of predic-
tions of future conduct is such that, at least in the present state of the
art, psychiatric diagnosticians can do little more than furnish advice
in terms of rough and uncertain guides. 3 While a healthy judicial
skepticism concerning the sufficiency of predictions based on psychia-
tric diagnosis would go far to cure the dangers inherent in such pre-
dictions, my own skepticism as to how skeptical judges are leads me to
favor a requirement of evidence of behavior objectively manifesting
dangerous tendencies to corroborate the psychiatric predictions.
Even if courts could obtain accurate predictions of probability, great
problems would remain in applying such data to specific cases. Re-
quiring proof of conduct indicating dangerousness would lessen the
grave risk of detaining persons who are harmless, a risk implicit in
reliance on any diagnostic or clinical test.37 If a fifty per cent likeli-
hood of future harmful conduct were sufficient to warrant commit-
ment, many people subject to commitment would nevertheless cause
no harm if they were allowed to remain free. Of course, the problem
of determining the degree of danger is not just a matter of quanti-
fying probabilities; some evaluation of the nature of the harmful
56. Morris, supra note 8, at 534-36.
57. Cf. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. I & 2), 113 U. PA. L. REV.
959, 1125, 1169-74 (1965). See also Livermore, Malmquist & Meeli, On the justification
for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 84-86 (1968) for the view diat even a highly
accurate clinical test for a statistically rare condition such as being a future killer is likely
to indicate many false positives for each true positive found by the test. Thus, acting on
the basis of such a test would result in the commitment of many harmless individuals. But
this risk might be substantially reduced if the initial focus of the courts were on conduct
substantially indicating dangerousness and the clinical or diagnostic predictions were used
to supplement the inferences drawn from such conduct.
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conduct feared and the interests threatened would have to be made.
If, for example, the person whose liberty is in question has merely
a tendency to commit petty larceny or write bad checks, a court
should take a different view of the appropriateness of commitment
than it would take toward someone whose propensities ran to homi-
cide. One would hope that the courts would refuse to permit commit-
ment merely to protect the public from minor property losses.38
In practice, determinations of the seriousness and probability of
harmful conduct which will justify commitment have rarely been made
by the courts, largely because preventive detention statutes have been
enacted with the question of dangerousness subsumed. Instead of di-
recting the courts to determine whether a particular drug user or sexual
deviant is dangerous enough to be committed, statutes typically pro-
vide for the commitment of drug addicts or sexual psychopaths as a
group.39 Faced with such statutes, the courts have considered only the
question of whether the defendant fell within the legislatively defined
class. While it may be argued that the legislature, in defining the com-
mittable category, has itself made a determination that all people in
that category are sufficiently dangerous to warrant commitment, in fact
no carefully considered legislative judgment on the question is likely
to have been made. In part this has been a result of the therapy fiction;
it is much easier to conclude that a group of people should be com-
pelled to undergo treatment in the hope that it will benefit some of
them than it is to face the fact that a group of people is being sub-jected to detention to prevent some portion of that group from engag-
ing in undesirable conduct in the future. In addition, it is far simpler
for legislatures to draft statutes in terms of broad, relatively objective
criteria than to attempt to distinguish varying probabilities and degrees
of danger as between persons falling within generally defined categories.
This suggests that in cases where the courts are called upon to apply
general commitment standards defining categories such as drug addicts,
sexual psychopaths, and the like, they should read into the legislative
88. But see Overholser v. Russell, 285 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960), (held, a continuedproclivity to write bad checks is sufficient dangerousness to self or others to bar release);Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (held, a proclivity to larceny suffi-
cient dangerousness to bar release).39. But see People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 398 P.2d 391, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1965),interpreting the provisions of the California narcotic commitment statute authorizing
commitment of "persons in imminent danger of becoming addicted" as requiring a findingthat the person has repeatedly used narcotics to the point where he is in imminent danger,in the common sense meaning of that phrase, of becoming emotionally or physically de-
pendent on their use.
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definition of the category some exceptions, recognizing that the cate-
gory itself presumes a general legislative judgment of dangerousness
or treatability or both. Thus, in cases where a person falling within tie
statutory category is neither dangerous nor likely to benefit from treat-
ment, neither commitment nor mandatory treatment should be im-
posed. For example, an elderly drug addict whose addiction is a product
of medical treatment for a prolonged terminal illness obviously should
not be committed as an addict. So too, if a statute authorizes commit-
ment of persons who repeatedly commit sexual offenses and a person
is charged because he is a homosexual who has repeatedly engaged in
unlawful but private homosexual relations with other adult homo-
sexuals, the courts should decline to order commitment, reading into
the statutory standard a requirement of substantial danger to the
public. Judicial willingness to interpret commitment statutes so as to
limit their applicability to persons constituting a significant threat
would partially mitigate the risks to liberty inherent in such statutes.
But something more than the power to create exceptions by reading
in requirements of substantial public danger is necessary to deal with
the possibility of cases in which the legislature authorizes commitment
of a category of persons none of whom pose any serious threat to the
public. There is also need for judicial authority to review the reason-
ableness and appropriateness of legislatively defined civil detention
categories themselves. While such review will be fraught with all the
difficulties inherent in substantive judicial review of the exercise of
legislative power, it seems just as necessary here as it is in the case of
legislation impinging upon the rights of free expression. Experience
indicates that in this country at least, legislatures have been less sen-
sitive than the courts to the rights and liberties of individuals who can
be considered threats to society. It is therefore desirable that the courts
have effective means of curbing legislative excesses in appropriate cases
by striking down statutory restraints upon personal liberty not reason-
ably necessary for the protection of the public.
There are, however, serious objections to reliance upon any ap-
proach which requires the courts to weigh degrees and probabilities of
danger and the reasonableness of particular kinds of preventive sanc-
tions. The problem is not lack of experience with such review; our
courts have for years tested restraints on personal liberty by delicate
balancing of competing individual rights, governmental interests, and
alternative means of achieving legislative purposes in cases involving
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freedom of association, 40 subversive activities,41 and marital privacy.42
But whenever a court seeks to strike down a governmental restraint
on personal liberty by asserting that a legislatively determined need is
really not necessary or a legislatively found danger not sufficiently dan-
gerous on balance to justify legislative action, the court is at the outer-
most border of judicial authority. Not only is it open to the criticism
that questions of reasonableness of legislation are not properly for
judicial determination, but the very broadness of the judgmental ques-
tion makes it difficult for the court to demonstrate the correctness of
its conclusion as against that reached by the legislature. Accordingly,
while such substantive review may be useful and necessary as a means
of striking down extreme and unquestionable abuses of legislative
power, it is not likely to prove effective as a limitation on legislative
power in close cases. The tendency will always be for courts to defer
to legislative findings of danger and legislative choices of appropriate
means of dealing with it, particularly when public sentiment is running
high. The stakes for the individuals involved in cases of civil detention
are too high to allow reliance upon such flexible restrictions.
Consider for example the possibility of enactment by the state of
Illinois of a statute authorizing the mayors of large cities to arrest
any member of a black nationalist or white racist organization, fol-
lowing a declaration by the governor of an emergency condition in
such city, when there was probable cause to believe that such person
would participate in rioting or violent attacks on the lives or property
of others.43 Would such a statute be constitutional? Are reasonableness,
necessity, or proportionality of restraint to danger adequate standards
for judging the legislation? Habitual resort by the courts to a balancing
test in such circumstances, emphasizing as it must the arguableness of
the issue, may operate as an inducement to the enactment of such
legislation and to official reliance upon it in planning for riot situa-
tions, thus rendering inevitable findings that the use of the statutes
was reasonably necessary if for no other reason that that no other alter-
40. NAACP v. Alabama, 557 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
Shelton v. Tucker, 564 U.S. 479 (1960).
41. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 867 U.S. 1 (1961);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967).
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. The New York Senate recently passed a bill giving judges power during a state
of emergency to set bail or hold defendants for up to 72 hours without a formal com-
plaint when arresting officers were unable to produce complainants because of the emer-
gency. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1968, at 94, col. 1.
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native could be considered to have been available at the time. This
likelihood is reason enough to suggest the need for simpler and dearer
limitations on resort to preventive detention.
Of course, over a long period of time, perhaps several generations,
a sufficient body of precedent or legal tradition could perhaps develop
from judicial reaction to extreme cases and extreme statutes so as
to permit the formulation of articulated doctrines of necessity and
appropriateness capable of enforcement by the courts. But until such
rules are developed the naked standard of reasonableness promises to
be an inadequate protection against legislative excess in the imposition
of preventive restraints. What must be found are limited legal doc-
trines, well within the legal tradition, which, with stringent standards
of procedural due process, can be used to brake and limit legislative
power to impose preventive restraints while the courts are working out
the content and scope of broader substantive restrictions like "neces-
sity" and "appropriateness." Since, as I have suggested above, the trend
of the law is toward a unitary sanction system, these judicial doctrines
must, if they are to retain vitality, be consistent with that trend. I
propose to elaborate, in the balance of this article, doctrines capable of
limiting legislative power to impose restraints which can be applied
consistent with the development of a unitary preventive correctional
system.
II. Preventive Detention and the Capacity to Conform to Legal Rules
One obvious limitation which courts can and should impose upon
legislative power to resort to preventive restraint is a requirement of
narrow definition of the conditions or propensities warranting the
imposition of detention. The magnitude of the individual losses of
liberty suffered if abuses of discretion result in unjustified commit-
ments renders the vice of vagueness particularly acute in this area.
Thus, for example, the courts should not hesitate to strike down pre-
ventive legislation aimed at "psychopaths," sexual or otherwise, or at
"agitators," "security risks," and the like, unless the statutes providing
for measures against such classes of persons dearly define the class.44
Nor should the courts tolerate statutes which provide for detainability
44. The daim of undue vagueness seems to have been uniformly rejected in cases
challenging civil commitment statutes: e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270 (1940); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); People v. Victor, 62
Cal. 2d 280, 299-06, 398 P.2d 391, 402-08, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 210-16 (1965); In re Dc La 0,
59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963); Director of Patuxent Institution
v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 897 (1966). But the very fact that the issue is raised and
reviewed suggests that there are constitutional limits to the indefiniteness of such statutes.
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by association, any more than they tolerate statutes defining crimes of
guilt by association. 45 But even certainty of categorization and a re-
quirement of a showing that an individual is himself within the defined
category because of his personal condition or propensities is insufficient
as a judicial safeguard.
A further limitation must go to the sort of conduct prevention of
which can justify the imposition of civil restraints. It is not enough that
the conduct feared be simply deviant. Preventive detention should
not be used unless there is a substantial probability of the future
occurrence of behavior which is dangerous to the lives or safety of
others and which could be punished under constitutional post hoc
penal sanctions.46 In a sense, preventive detention is merely the crimi-
nal law viewed in advance. Moral aversion which is insufficient to
justify punishment after the fact should be equally insufficient to
justify preventive detention before the fact.
47
Although the limitations on civil restraints already enumerated
would go far to restrict their use to persons who are a sufficient danger
to society to justify depriving them of their liberty, no principle has
as yet been suggested for distinguishing cases in which civil detention
is appropriate from those in which prevention should properly be left
to the criminal law. The distinction is an important one because of
the enormous difference in consequences to the potentially harmful
individual. If penal sanctions are thought to be sufficient, he will be
let alone, free to order his movements and affairs as he sees fit, until
such time as he actually commits a criminally harmful act. If he is
then convicted and sent to prison, it will normally be for some limited
term thought to be commensurate with the gravity of the offense com-
mitted. Should he in fact manage to control his presumptively deviant
proclivities and never engage in the harmful conduct feared, he will re-
main permanently free of this governmental interference with his
45. Cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 222 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 330-31 (1957).
46. Civil commitment is widely used for harmless but senile or otherwise incurably
incompetent persons. Cf. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The propriety of
such commitments depends on the impossibility of providing care by means short of
institutionalization. Even where such commitment is necessary, it should, whenever
possible, be to institutions which aim for pleasant and open care as a goal rather than
therapy and protection, the goals of state mental hospitals. The establishment of Institu-
tional alternatives to state mental hospitals would probably decrease the need for in-
voluntary commitment of harmless incompetents.
47. "Hippies," for instance, espouse attitudes, values and ways of life which threaten
the ideals and values of many people, probably a majority, in this country. In a
very real sense they could be considered dangerous to the middle class suburban way of
life. But it would be unthinkable to make it a crime to behave like a hippy, and it should
be impossible to enact statutes detaining hippies for the purpose of preventing such
behavior.
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liberty. If, on the other hand, preventive detention is thought appro-
priate, the same individual could be deprived immediately of his
liberty for an indeterminate and perhaps permanent period. Treat-
ability cannot be the differentiating factor, because civil restraints
are in fact imposed on the untreatably dangerous quite as readily as
upon those for whom cure is a real possibility. And to say that the
question is merely one of the probability and severity of the harm
threatened is only to rephrase the problem of drawing the proper lines.
Basic to Anglo-American criminal law is a postulate of freedom of
choice; 48 that the ordinary person can conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law if he wants to do so. This postulate of freedom is
not an empirically derived conclusion, but rather an ideological prem-
ise of the law which, like the precept of equality before the law, is
normatively required by our legal system. 49 The postulate of freedom
represents our society's judgment that the best way to prevent most
people from causing harm to others is to deter them with the threat
of punishment rather than to incapacitate or restrain them before-
hand on purely predictive grounds. This way seems best not because
it is most efficient as a preventive but because, given the primacy of
personal autonomy as a value in our culture, it is the best balance
between preventive security and personal liberty. If we impose pre-
ventive restraints on people who presumptively are as much responsive
to traditional proscriptive restraints as the rest of us, we repudiate this
balance and the presumption in favor of personal autonomy upon
which it is based, creating greater risks to our own autonomy than the
risk we assume in allowing the merely attitudinally dangerous their
first bite.5°
48. The phrase is adapted from Dr. Bernard Diamond, testifying as a witness in the
landmark case of People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 724, 336 P.2d 492, 497 (1959).
49. While philosophers, theologians, scientists and lawyers have debated for cen-
turies whether such a thing as "free will" really exists, society and the law have no
choice in the matter. We must proceed, until a firm alternative is available, on the
scientifically unprovable assumption that human beings make choices in the regu-
lation of their conduct and that they are influenced by society's standards as well as
by personal standards.
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger. J., concurring).
See also Cardozo, J., in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 501 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
50. The basic notion of the criminal law which makes punishment of offenders legiti-
mate in a free society is that the offender has disregarded the law, has chosen to violateit even though he was capable of obeying it. It is such disregard which we impute to an
offender when we speak of him as blameworthy or guilty, and it is his guilt which legiti-
mates and justifies the imposition on him of sanctions which it would be unjust to impoeee
on others. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. RIv. 367.
392-93 (1965). It would be illegitimate to impose such sanctions on the blameless in part.
of course, because it would be unfair. But behind the notion of fairness or justice is the
basic precept or condition of a free society-the citizen's expectation of enjoying liberty
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But the postulate of freedom is rebuttable, so far as particular in-
dividuals are concerned, by facts showing that they suffer from condi-
tions precluding effective exercise of the mental and emotional facul-
ties requisite to the processes of controlling their behavior in accordance
with proscriptive rules.al When the presumption of an individual's
capacity to conform is rebutted by a showing of a special disability
not shared by all men, it is possible to justify the imposition of pre-
ventive restraints without placing all men under the threat of a similar
infringement of their personal autonomy. Thus a determination of
mental illness or other control-related psychological deviance serves
the same function for preventive detention that conviction of a crime
serves for penal incarceration-it becomes a basis for separating out a
class of restrainable persons without threatening all citizens with sub-
jection to similar restraints. The concept of personal responsibility-
the other side of the lack-of-control coin-may thus be seen as a func-
tional concept, serving to protect individual liberty and dignity from
prior restraint.
Traditionally, our law has taken the approach that an individual is
either responsible or irresponsible, without recognizing degrees of
partial responsibility. This all or nothing approach is not, of course,
consistent with psychological reality. Nor does it seem to be a require-
ment of the postulate of freedom since there is no reason why the
presumption of freedom cannot be rebutted in part as well as in whole,
provided that we have available reasonably sophisticated and discrete
means of dealing with degrees of partial responsibility by degrees of
partial and limited restraints. In recent years attempts have been made
to introduce doctrines of partial or diminished responsibility into the
substantive criminal law. Their success has been limited, however,
largely because there has not yet been developed an effective system
of partial restraints which can operate to protect society without un-
duly sacrificing personal liberty.52 It makes good sense to speak of an
alcoholic or narcotic addict as having diminished capacity to control
his behavior, but full recognition of his diminished responsibility must
await some means of disposition other than incarceration in a mental
hospital as a substitute for imprisonment. Civil commitment itself
and avoiding sanctions if he obeys the law. Kadish, supra note 12. To impose sanctions
on the law-abiding is to undercut this precept and thereby threaten the security and
liberty of all citizens.
51. This is, of course, the basis for the insanity defense. See MODEL PENAL CODn § 4.01,
Comments 2-4 (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale ol the Law
of Homicide, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 701, 752-57 (1937).
52. Cf. A. GoLxsTE N, THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 171-202 (1967).
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may be seen as an attempt, albeit rough and misguided, to develop
alternatives to punishment as a means of restraining persons with
certain kinds of diminished capacity to conform.
Preventive detention can legitimately be imposed only in cases
where, at a minimum, the person to be restrained lacks ordinary
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.53 One
who cannot be expected to conform to the law cannot be blamed for
nonconformity, but his inability to obey may justify preventive re-
straints if his inability is sufficiently threatening to the safety and wel-
fare of others.54
Such immobility is the real and legitimate basis for the requirement
of some condition of incapacity or illness as a requirement for the im-
position of preventive detention. It is not the therapeutic mask, the
often unrealizable hope that effective treatment can be offered, but the
recognition of some disability in their capacity to conform which justi-
fies special treatment of the mentally ill, psychopaths and, perhaps,
drug addicts. Therefore, a narrowly drafted statute authorizing com-
mitment of opiate addicts-persons who have reached a state of
psychophysical dependence on drugs which renders them unable to
conform to legal proscriptions-does not pose the same danger to
liberty that a statute authorizing commitment of marijuana users
would pose.
The recognition that a condition of volitional incapacity affecting
the person's ability to respond to legal rules is a necessary precondition
to a libertarian system of preventive detention also provides a per-
spective which makes it possible to develop a unitary conception of the
relationship of criminal and civil responsibility. The behavior of
those whom we presume to be capable of choice is properly controlled
with post hoc criminal sanctions; the behavior of those who cannot
choose is appropriately subject, in cases where they are dangerous,
to preventive civil detention. Just as it is blameworthiness for choos-
ing to disregard the rules which is the legitimating factor for imposing
sanctions under the criminal law, so it is incapacity to regard and obey
the rules which is a legitimating factor for imposing detention upon
the basis of a prediction of future violations. The significance of the
53. See Note, "Imminent Danger of Addiction" as a Ground for Involuntary Commit-
ment in California-People v. Victor, 64 McH. L. REv. 546 (1966); Note, Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, supra note 8, at 1289.90.54. Cf. Sling, "Rule of Law" in Criminal Justice, in EssAms IN CnxmsNAt Scaw.-cu 77,113-19 (G. Mueller ed. 1951), discussing the development of non-penal measures in oni.
nental Europe.
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legitimating factors in both cases is that they serve to maximize the
liberty and security of every citizen capable of obeying the law.
Thus traditional concepts of personal responsibility serve a liber-
tarian function. This may not, however, seem a sufficient point in
their favor to those who recognize that such concepts are inseverable
from our cultural traditions relating to choice and moral guilt; tradi-
tions which are rejected by schools of psychiatry which see notions of
guilt and fault as imposing a major burden on the human psyche and
contributing to a significant portion of mental illness. Yet psychiatric
efforts to find means to alleviate a patient's excessive feelings of guilt
do not necessarily require that the concept of guilt be extirpated from
our social system. Indeed, though excessive guilt feelings may be a
major cause or symptom of personality distress, we should beware of a
young science's attempt to alleviate illness by a kind of psychiatric
tonsilectomy; removal of a natural mechanism of personal adjust-
ment which is still inadequately understood. It may well be that
the emotion of guilt is a necessary component of human self-direction,
a means by which conflicting drives are regulated so as to permit the
necessary socializing of the human personality. In a society where
human relationships are founded upon generally accepted standards
of proper behavior, attempts to eliminate the emotion of guilt as a
factor influencing behavior seem to me to be misguided.
Instead, given the extent to which we encourage individual auton-
omy and yet expect substantial conformity of behavior in social con-
texts, it seems that we should encourage inculcation of personal re-
sponsibility to the greatest degree obtainable by the individual. Civil
restraint, at least for the treatable, should serve as a buttress to support
the individual and protect society while he is encouraged to recognize
that within the degree of his capabilities both self-esteem and guilt
are products of his own efforts at self control.55 In a system in which
autonomous, self-directed conformity with accepted norms represents
the highest form of social adjustment, imputations of partial or total
irresponsibility are not merciful dispensations to the individual but
severe determinations of social disability. An important aim of the
legal and, in appropriate cases, therapeutic systems should thus be to
develop autonomy through devices of self-direction including the
55. I do not mean to suggest here that guilt is a useful tool for dealing with those who
are so irresponsible that concepts of choice and control do not apply to them at all. Only
those who demonstrate the degree of ability to choose which we denominate partial
responsibility can benefit from the pressures of a sense of guilt, and only they should be
deliberately subjected to it.
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emotion of personal guilt. We have heretofore avoided such concepts
in the civil commitment area because of traditions of a penal-civil
dichotomy and because in our penal system we still retain savagely
anachronistic punitive approaches with which the concept of guilt is
associated. Only our barbaric treatment of responsible criminals could
have misled us into believing that a finding of mental incapacity was
a dispensation. 6 As our treatment of responsible prisoners improves,
we will become more aware of the inappropriateness of our handling
of irresponsible mental patients.
Critics have been contending for years that present concepts of
criminal responsibility are outmoded.57 Some have argued for a sub-
stitute approach in which the law would be concerned only with a
preliminary question: did the subject of the proceedings engage in
the harmful or dangerous conduct of which he is accused? A finding
that he did would then be a basis for turning his case over to another
official body of psychiatrists or correctional authorities to determine
the appropriate disposition in his case."5
56. "For all practical purposes the furor over M'Naghten is confined to the disposition
of offenders convicted of murder. It is the death penalty which sparks the quarrel."
Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 49 A.B.A.J.
1075, 1079 (1963). See also A. GoLnsrmN, THE INSANITY DErss 19-20, 214-217 (1967).
57. These criticisms tend to duster about the problem of the insanity defense. See,
e.g., Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L REy.
378, 389-90 (1952); G. ZILBOORG, Tm PSYCHOLOGY OF Tm CRIMINAL Act An PUNtsim- rr
120-36 (1954); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Can. L Ray. 325,
327 (1955); Roche, Criminal Responsibility, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 107, 113-14 (P.
Hoch 9- J. Zubin eds. 1955); Weintraub, supra note 55; Remarks by Weintraub, J., at
Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit, 37 F.R.D. 365. 369 (1964); Remarks
by Biggs, J., id. 395; H.L.A. HART, THE MORAITrrY OF THE CM.IINAL LA-w (1964); Morris,
Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAr. L. REv. 514 (1963). The last article
contains an appendix summarizing the view of several other critics of the law's approach
to criminal responsibility. Id. 544-47.
58. Weintraub, Remarks, supra note 57; Biggs, supra note 57; B. WooroN, CnLMs, AND
THE CRImiNAL LAw 41-57, 74-84 (1963). Perhaps the most utopian, forceful, and frightening
statement of this approach is that urged by Roche, supra note 57, at 113-14:
All persons irrespective of mental state could be regarded as responsible in the sense
that they are susceptible to incapacitating legal sanctions in keeping with the aims of
deterrence, security, treatment, and reformation. This would eliminate all trial issues
irrelevant to the questions of fact of the unlawful behavior, and would leave open
the question of the offender's disposition to administrative application of tested
scientific knowledge. It would leave to the courts the public exercise of legal guilt-
finding and relieve the courts of the sole responsibility for determining appropriate
measures to insure community protection and the offender's reformation, it pos-
sible ....
.. * Our idea contemplates an enhancement of the dignity and public respect for
law enforcement. The view of universal responsibility cannot be applicable as long
as the concept of responsibility is confined to its narrow, medieval meaning, a liability
to punishment. It is applicable if the concept is brought to a broader social thera-
peutic meaning, a liability to comprehensive treatment provided by law ..... Uni-
versal responsibility lays open to the law breaker, regardless of mental status, a
liability to a rational clinical manipulation which has within its resources imprison-
ment, hospitalization, probation psychotherapy, and so on.
And some proponents of this approach are seemingly prepared to apply it not only
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This approach has some very real advantages. It would eliminate
some of the anomalies in traditional legal tests of responsibility based
on mixed psychiatric and moral judgments. Yet the attractiveness of
such an approach is somewhat illusory; someone must still decide who
shall be detained, who shall be treated, who shall be punished, and
what is treatment and what is punishment. 0 Nor is it at all clear
that such questions will necessarily be answered better by judges who
are psychiatrists than they are answered by judges who are lawyers
or judges who are jurymen. The point is that whoever makes the
decision will in fact be functioning as a judge regardless of the title
under which he exercises his commission. It may be that psychia-
trists are better equipped than lawyers or laymen to make such judg-
ments in most cases. But we must recognize that no matter who makes
the decisions, the basic problem will remain the same: on what con-
siderations shall such judgments be made? It is my belief that three
basic considerations must be taken into account: (1) the need to
protect society, (2) the need to help the individual to achieve a more
meaningful and rewarding life, and (3) the recognition that the person
whose freedom is at stake is a human being and that we all have a
stake in the dignity and freedom of every other human being. When
we ask how these considerations relate to the question of what should
be done with someone who is dangerous, we can begin to focus our
attention not on labels of punishment and treatment but rather on
the development of effective measures for protecting the public,
maximizing personal dignity and autonomy, and providing effective
therapy.60
where the acts are of minor criminal nature, but also where they are not necessarily
criminal at all. Thus Dr. Lawrence Kolb, Director of the New York State Psychiatric
Institute, speaking at a panel on "Insanity As a Defense" at the Annual Judicial Con-
ference, Second Judicial Circuit (1964) stated:
If I were judging an individual who was accident prone and his accident prone-
ness was exhibited on the road where he could maim repeatedly many many people,
I would certainly withdraw his license, restrict his right to drive, and insist on
continuing treatment. I might insist his sentence bind him longer than another man
who performed a single murder under the force of some overwhelming emotion.
37 F.R.D. 399 (emphasis added).
Of course, Dr. Kolb may be using the term sentence to refer solely to denial of a driver's
license rather than to treatment under custody. But what of the accident prone person
whose accident proneness was exhibited off the road as well as on?
59. These terms would then be inappropriate, but the underlying concepts would
remain the same.
60. I must confess that my own view of the basic appropriateness of an insanity
defense and notions of criminal responsibility have been severely tested by the arguments
of Professor Morris in his recent article, supra note 57. He demonstrates that In practice
the insanity defense serves to impose a double stigma on those who are both
mentally ill and commit crimes, id. 524-25, and that recogizing an insanity defense
tends to perpetuate the injustice of holding to full responsibility and punishing those
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I have argued above that preventive detention cannot be imposed
on a person with normal capacity to control his behavior without
threatening the liberty and security of all free citizens. Thus there is
a close relationship between behavioral incapacity and the consti-
tutionality of civil detention. The relationship is not, however, that
which has frequently been suggested-that civil restraint may only be
imposed for the purpose of providing therapeutic treatment for the
person so restrained.6 1 Paradoxically, the confusion of disability with
treatability and the resulting tendency of legislatures, psychiatric
agencies, and the courts to rationalize decisions to detain in terms of
therapy has inhibited the development of adequate legal safeguards
to protect persons who are civilly committed.12 Since it has been
thought that the only justification for preventively detaining a dan-
gerous person was the possibility of treatment, there has been a ten-
dency to fictionalize the notion of treatment.63 The result has been
the justification as therapeutic of procedures and practices which are
neither therapeutic nor imposed in conformity with traditional stan-
dards of due process of law for non-therapeutic confinement.
In the last few years the problem of preventive detention under
the guise of treatment has produced discussion and several judicial
who by reasons of social and cultural causes commit crimes they are no less free to
avoid committing. Id. 520. It seems to me, however, that the answer to Professor Morris's
view lies in the fact that he is attacking an essentially valid moral and ethical principle-
that those who are without guilt should not be punished-by demonstrations that we do
punish such people in violation of this principle.
The question remains whether it is the principle that is wrong or the practice. And
if we eliminated the principle would our practices improve, or can improvement be wooner
achieved by retaining the principle and vigorously seeking to demonstrate the short-
comings in our practices when held up to the standard of our principlesi There is no
reason to accept either the double stigmatization of the mentally ill and dangerous or the
failure to recognize social and cultural dynamics as a factor in determining criminal
responsibility. Once we eliminate the either-or standard of criminal responsibility and
begin to develop effective alternatives to incarceration as both a sanction and restraint,
the concept of responsibility will be a useful, practical as well as conceptual, principle for
dealing with dangerous people who commit crimes because they are more or less com-
pelled to do so.
61. E.g., Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Editorial, A New
Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960); cf. Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rmv.
1134, 1139-40 (1967).
62. See cases cited in note 14 supra. For a recent case interesting for its assertion of
the antiquated notion that "The constitutional provisions relating to due process are not
applicable to a person restrained as insane," see Rose v. Haugh, 259 Iowa 1344, 1346, 147
N.W.2d 865, 866 (1967). See also Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, supra
note 9, at 1166-68.
63. Under some circumstances custodial care, standing alone, is a form of therapy
for some conditions; the terms used in this record such as "environmental therapy"
or "milieu therapy" are simply psychiatric descriptions of a form of treatment con-
sisting of custody in an appropriate and protected atmosphere from which departure
is not permitted.
Collins v. Cameron, 577 F.2d 945, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.) (affirming disnisal of
habeas corpus petition).
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decisions invoking a "right to treatment." Since the landmark case
of Rouse v. Cameron 5 has been widely discussed,00 its details will not
be elaborated here. While Rouse found a statutory basis for the right
to treatment it asserted, 7 the case also suggests a constitutional basis
for the right, derived from the theory that civil commitment is con-
stitutionally permissible only if treatment actually follows the com-
mitment.68 Unfortunately there are difficulties inherent in the right
to treatment theory, as the progeny of the Rouse case demonstrate, 09
which makes it unworkable either as a theory or a meaningful pro-
tection for persons civilly committed. Obviously the courts will have
great difficulty in resolving questions of the adequacy of treatment,
not to speak of the problems inherent in determining what shall
qualify as treatment in the first place. More troubling, however, is
the failure of the theory to deal with the very real problems of purely
preventive detention. Among the conditions which might legitimately
induce a legislature to provide for the imposition of civil detention are
illnesses or disorders for which there is no known effective cure. Most
notable of course is the condition of sociopathy, the very condition
from which Rouse was said to be suffering. Given the fact that cure
is presently impossible, almost anything or nothing could be said
to be treatment in such cases. Psychoanalysis, group therapy, and
acupuncture could all be said in a sense to represent forms of treat-
ment given the incurability of the illness.70 In such cases "treatment"
64. Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cameron,
379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Collins v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1967): Mlllard
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Nason v. Superintendent,--Mass.-, 233 N.E2d 908 (1968); Eidinoff v. Connolly, 281
F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
65. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
66. Note, 80 HARv. L. REv. 898 (1967); Note, 42 NoTm DAME LAw. 573 (1967); Note, 45TEx. L. REv. 777 (1967); Note, 42 TUL. L. REV. 407 (1968); Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, supra note 8; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treat.
ment, supra note 9.
67. 373 F.2d at 453-54.
68. Id. at 453, 455.
69. Cases cited notes 63 and 64 supra. The Rouse case itself came full drcle when
in Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court ordered Rouse released onhabeas corpus because he had been improperly committed pursuant to a determination
of insanity, where the insanity defense was invoked by his lawyer against his wishes.
Judge Danaher, in dissent, pointed out that in the hearing after the court's initial deci-
sion in the case, Rouse was unable to establish the inadequacy of the treatment afforded
to him.
70. Cf. Collins v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1967). I recall reading, some years
ago, a description of a development in the People's Republic of China. In the wake of
the victory of the Communist government efforts were made to improve the medical treat-
ment of the population as part of the general effort to modernize and reform Chinese
life. Shortly afterwards, however, the government began to recogize and approve the
traditional folk medicine of acupuncture, the practice of curing illnesses by sticking pins
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can mean nothing more than benign and comfortable custody,
which is treatment in the sense that the patient is kept from mani-
festing his symptoms. To so define treatment reduces the right to
treatment to a right to be treated humanely, a worthy right but one
existing, at least in theory, long before the Rouse case. On the other
hand, if the right to treatment means a right to therapy promising a
cure of the illness or condition for which detention was imposed, the
right should not be considered a constitutionally commanded pre-
condition of civil restraint. For quarantine as well as therapy would
seem to be a legitimate basis for detention; society must have the
right to protect itself from dangerously ill persons even if it is unable
to cure them in the process. 71 To suggest that the right to treatment
means that commitment cannot be "civil" if there is no hope for cure
largely misses the point of preventive detention. It is indefinite deten-
tion for being dangerous-regardless of specific criminal acts and
whether or not cure is possible-which is the essence of preventive
detention. And it is prevention rather than treatment which is the
dominant motivation for the commitment of most dangerously deviant
persons.
It has been suggested in a thoughtful comment in this journal that
resolution of the Rouse problem could be achieved by requiring strict
penal due process for purely preventive detention while allowing
looser commitment procedures where the detention promises to be
therapeutic.72 But given the uncertainties of what constitutes treat-
ment and whether it can be effective, as well as the importance of
accurate factual judgments in determining who should be committed
in all cases, it would seem that stringently fair and accurate procedures
should be required in both situations."h If this position is correct,
into different parts of the body. Apparently the Communist regime, unable to provide
modem and adequate medical facilities, elected to legitimate and support the treatment
and facilities which were available.
71. In Fuller v. United States, 390 F.2d 468, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1967), judge Bazelon,
the author of the Rouse opinion, seems himself to have recognized this principal. Noting
that civil commitment of the defendant would probably be equivalent to commitment
for life in view of the probability that his dangerous abnormality yas caued by organic
brain damage, he nevertheless concurred in the remand to the trial court to determine
among other things whether defendant should be committed as a sexual psychopath.
While Judge Bazelon suggests that the trial judge consider whether other lesser depriva-
tious of liberty would sufficiently protect the public, his opinion makes it clear that, if
necessary, civil confinement would be appropriate.
72. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and The Right to Treatment, supra note 9,
at 102-03, 115-16.
73. A shocking example of diagnostic error, compounded by administrative sloppiness
leading to a mixup in patient records, is presented in Egan v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
377 (C. CL 1958), reprinted in KA-z, GoLDsTN, & Daasnown-z 735-38. Egan, in a
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then the rule of Rouse offers no useful guides at all. Yet the Rouse
case does stand for the fundamental proposition that even dangerously
defective persons are human beings who cannot be ignored or de-
humanized because of public apathy and lack of funds.7" The impor-
tance of the Rouse case lies not in its holding but in the reason for
its holding, in its search for a judicial solution to an intolerable social
evil-the dehumanization of human beings because they happen to be
dangerously deviant.7 5
III. Civil Restraints and Compensation
The substantive and procedural limitations already elaborated
would go far to keep the use of civil detention within bounds dic-
tated by our society's commitment to the maximum of individual
autonomy consistent with a reasonable degree of social order. But the
individuals actually deprived of their liberty are still in the position
of having their freedom taken from them against their will, although
they are innocent of wrongdoing and will not benefit from the deten-
tion.7 6 In effect their liberty is being taken for the benefit of the public.
It can be small comfort indeed that such deprivations of liberty are
relatively rare, factually appropriate and judicially determined to be
reasonable. Those detained are still deprived of most of what makes
life worth living: their freedom of movement, their creature comforts,
and the basic dignity attaching to status as autonomous citizens respon-
sible for directing their own lives.
Consider the case of a migrant worker, traveling with his family
far from home, who is detained as a material witness.77 Unable to raise
bail, he can sit in jail with no means of providing for his family and
no income other than the statutory pittance which some states are
military hospital for treatment of bronchitis, was mistakenly diagnosed as mentally ill
when doctors erroneousl concluded that an incident he reported had not occurred.Confined as mentally ill, his efforts to prove that the diagnosis had been mistaken were
regarded as proof of his illness. Medical records of another man named Egan becamepart of his case history. For other examples of tragic diagnostic errors, see Beaver, The
"Mentally Ill" and the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 1, 21-22, 24-26.74. Cf. D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER (1966).75. Cf. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, supra note 9,
at 114.
76. In the case of untreatably dangerous individuals who are simply quarantined, nobenefit whatever is received. In the case of the treatably dangerous the benefit received,if it is received, does not equal the price paid, since but for the need to protect society,
similar treatment could in most cases be provided without the detention.
77. Quince v. Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349 (1959). Pursuant to the statutes of
many states an indigent person who has the misfortune to be an innocent witness to
another person's crime may be jailed to assure his availability at that other person's trid,
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generous enough to allow in such cases.78 To such a man his time is
literally money, for it is time spent in labor which is the only asset
he has to provide for himself and his family. He has done no wrong
and is not dangerous to others in any way; the taking of his liberty
is justified, if justified at all, only because the taking is temporary and
his testimony is necessary for a public purpose-the need to do justice
between the state and the defendant. Of course if the state were to
take his property for a public purpose, it would have to pay adequate
compensation as a matter of constitutional due process. But for some
reason it is thought that when mere liberty is taken, compensation
is, at best, a matter of legislative grace.
A radical proposal seems to me appropriate. Whenever the state finds
it necessary to take an innocent man's liberty for a public purpose, due
process should require the state to pay adequate compensation for the
taking. I would concede of course that liberty is not identical to prop-
erty, but the Fifth Amendment speaks of both together in the due pro-
cess clause. In our modem world, distinctions between property and
personal liberty do not seem so clear as they once were. Property, after
all, is but the fruit of the productive use of personal liberty. Intangible
rights are not without their value, and our law has found means of
making monetary evaluations and providing compensation when in-
tangibles are taken by private persons. Rights of action e.ist for tortious
interference with reputation, privacy and even liberty itself. Our law
has long recognized suits for false arrest and false imprisonment. It
seems but a natural extension, though an extension it is, to suggest
that when, for its own purposes, a state decides to take a man's liberty,
justice and the Constitution require the state to pay compensation for
the taking.
A requirement of compensation has more to support it than the
obvious constitutional analogy; it would also serve to vindicate the
compensated individual's dignity and status as a person. Like his rights
to procedural due process and fundamental fairness, it would serve
to affirm his continuing membership in society as an individual before
the law. Paradoxically perhaps, the fixing of a cash price which must
be paid for an innocent man's liberty would not cheapen his liberty
but instead should give it greater meaning. Payment of compensation
would serve significant practical purposes as well. Obviously, the obliga-
78. See Barber v. Moss, 3 Utah 2d 268, 282 P.2d 838 (1955). The New York statute
allows the munificent sum of "not... greater than . . . three dollars for each day of
actual detention." N.Y. CODE OF cRuIM. PRoC. § 618-b (McKinney 1958).
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tion to pay when a person's liberty is taken would act to deter legisla-
tures and administrators from resort to unnecessary seizures of liberty.
The danger would have to be real and the necessity apparent before
officials would be willing to pay out public funds in this way. More,
important, the payment of adequate compensation could operate as a
substantial impetus to the development of meaningful reforms in the
treatment of inmates.
The need for reform is notorious. Denied all economic and political
leverage, the civil inmate is powerless to cause any improvement
in the inadequate facilities, insufficient staff, low staff morale and token
treatment which result from minimal public financing.70 The payment
of compensation to persons committed because they are dangerous
would give such persons greater leverage in relation to the administra-
tion of the institution in which they are held. It would enable them, for
instance, to purchase adequate legal services rather than relying on the
charity of the state or their families to provide counsel. Inmates able to
benefit from treatment would be able to pay for adequate therapy and
even, perhaps, for confinement in a private hospital in lieu of confine-
ment at a state institution. Compensating the inmate could give him
bargaining power, introducing market factors into the institutional
system. The resulting demand might well lead to the supplying of
more effective custodial and therapeutic alternatives to the present
system. Just as important, there would be an increase in the personal
autonomy of the inmate in direct proportion to his ability to pay for
and thus command personal luxuries0 not provided by a system in
79. Fried, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1319 (1963); Arens, The Durham
Rule in Action, 1 LAW & Soc. Ray. 41, 53-57 (June 1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental
Illness, and the Right to Treatment, supra note 9, at 88-89 nnA&5. See Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), quoting Dr. Harry C. Solomon, President of the American
Psychiatric Association as follows:
After 114 years of effort, in this year 1958, rarely has a state hospital an adequate
staff measured by the minimum standard set by our association, and these standards
represent a compromise between what was thought to be adequate and what it was
thought had some possibility of being realized.
Id. at 458 n.38, citing Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to
American Psychiatry, 115 AM. J. PSyCHiATRY 1, 7 (1958). THE JoINT CObIMIUSSlON ON MENTAL
ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH (1961), (hereinafter cited as ActioN
FOR MENTAL HEALTH) recommended that expenditures for public mental health should be
doubled in the next five years and tripled in the next ten. Id. 284. It states that: "only
by this magnitude of expenditure can typical state hospitals be made in fact what they
are now in name only-hospitals for mental patients." Id. The report further states:
.. the information we have leads us to believe that more than half of the patients
in most state hospitals receive no active treatment of any kind designed to improve
their mental condition.
Id. 22-23.
80. Economic power, permitting the patient some autonomy in the selection of thera-
pists and persons providing other services from haircuts to legal advice, could well serve
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which appropriations and expenditures are made in terms of legislative
and administrative priorities.81 Thus the development of some "con-
sumer autonomy" for inmates would serve both as a means of increas-
ing the individual dignity and autonomy of the inmate and as a means
of encouraging the development of improvements in, and alternatives
to, state administered institutions with limited budgets providing
minimal treatment and minimal services.
Viewed strictly from the standpoint of the loss to the individual
detained, the argument for compensation is strongest in cases of purely
preventive detention of the incurably dangerous, from which the in-
mate derives no benefit. But in terms of the potential gain for society
and the individual involved, compensation is particularly promising
in application to the treatably dangerous, because of the possibilities
for escape from the crippling effects of administrative duties and in-
adequate funds on institutional psychiatrists and other therapists.
Providing inmates with the financial ability to pay for treatment should
lead to the development of a group of independent psychiatrists who
would provide treatment to mental patients without becoming part
of the administrative staff of the custodial institution.82 Such a develop-
to minimize the patients "sense of powerlessness." Cf. Pine & Levinson. A Sociopsycho.
logical Conception of Patienthood in THE SOCOLOGY O' M "rI. Dtsonmmi.s 219. 225
(K. Weinberg ed. 1967). D. VAIL, supra note 74, at 184-85, discusses the importance of eco-
nomic autonomy. "'We have always felt favorably inclined to a system in which patients
would be paid true value for the work they do, charged for the services they reccive, and
taxed on the profit, just like the rest of us. There are many practical difficultes in the way
however." Vail notes that in most public mental hospitals, patients perform menial tasks,
necessary to the functioning of the institution, receiving token compensation or no com-
pensation at all. See also Bartlett, Institutional Peonage, AnmAic Mo.ntLy (July 1964).
The importance of personal possessions as a means of combatting institutional neurosis and
thus helping in the therapeutic process is discussed in R. BARTON, I:.srrrtmo.iAL NEU-
Rosis 49-50 (2d ed. 1966); cf. E. GOFF.uAN, AsYLttS 19 (1961).
81. This institution operates on a bedrock of primitive necessity. Discussions at
general staff meetings focus upon such topics as the quality of food, fire hazards.
providing ash trays, and getting enough patient-workers for the laundry. These
topics may appear trivial to the outsider and may reinforce his conception of the
state hospital as custodial in character, but in fact they reflect the realities of a daly)
struggle to keep patients housed, clothed, and fed.
While we did not study the bureaucratic apparatus tying hospital to stale capital.
we could not be there without becoming aware of some consequences of this political
link for ward personnel. "Springfield" hovers in the air, the mysterious source of the
means for survival, frustration and even punishment. Requisitions disappear into
an administrative maze leading to Springfield. The lack of understanding of and
control over this maze engenders a sense of hopelessness among the personnel:
"Nothing can be done about it" becomes a familiar refrain while they "make do"
with what is actually available.
A. STRAuss, L. SCHAvMAN, R. BucHEP, D. EsaLICH & M. SAsum, PSYMcnitMC IDrOLOGlUS
AND INsrrrT ONS 99 (1964); see Arens, supra note 79, at 53-54, 59-60.
82. The report of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health notes a general
shortage of psychiatrists and mental health professionals aggravated by the fact that the
vast majority of psychiatrists go into private practice or devote a large part of their time
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ment, moreover, could ultimately lead to a further appropriate re-
form-separation of the custodial and therapeutic functions.
In today's "total institutions"8 3 for civil detention a single adminis-
trative system makes the decisions concerning both therapy and cus-
todial administration. Yet the two functions are different and will often
conflict. Psychiatrists who choose their profession because of an interest
in providing therapy find themselves forced to be concerned with
administrative supervision, custodial discipline, and security, to say
nothing of effective public relations and lobbying to secure adequate
funds for the decent administration of their institutions. Many of the
ablest young psychiatrists soon leave such institutions because of their
unwillingness to serve as custodians.8 4 Those who stay are faced with
the unhappy necessity of sacrificing the therapeutic needs of the indi-
vidual patient in the interest of custodial efficiency and institutional
security, so as not to jeopardize the position of the entire institution,
and thus its other inmates, by unfavorable publicity. The conflict of
purposes is likely to lead therapist-administrators to rationalize mea-
sures adopted for custodial convenience as intended for therapeutic
purposes. 85 Since measures can be justified as treatment which could
not be justified if imposed for reasons of custodial discipline, the con-
fusion of therapeutic and custodial aims may be seriously unfair and
even counter-therapeutic to patient-inmates.8 0 Thus it would seem to
be in the interest of both fair administration and effective therapy that
administrative decision-making be separated from therapeutic judg-
ments. The logical means of achieving such separation would seem to
be the divorce of custodial administration from therapeutic respon-
sibilities.s7 Adequately compensating the patient and then charging
to private practice, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 146-55. While economic considerations
are no doubt involved, Goffman reports that "In many mental hospitals there Is a record
of disgruntled psychiatrists asserting they are leaving so they can do psychotherapy."
E. GOFFMAN, AsywUt*s 92 (1961).
83. The phrase is Goffman's: "Their encompassing or total character is symbolized
by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure ... such as lockeddoors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or moors." Id. 4.
84. Id. 92.
85. D. VAI, supra note 74, at 91, cites an example from a Minnesota manual of pro-
cedures for patients in institutions for the mentally retarded. A policy bars furloughs
for children to visit their families at Christmas because of uncertainty of the weatfher
which might lead to the children's "being disappointed," the danger of contagious dis-
eases, and "staffing problems." As Vail notes: "What is so painfully obvious, of course,is that the procedure is devised for the convenience of the staff." Id. Vail adds, however,
that the manual is now discarded.
86. See AcTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 175, quoting M. SCHWARTZ et al., NEW PERSPEcrivEs
ON MENTAL PATIENT CARE; The Case of Bernard Goldfine, Transcript of Habeas Corpus
Hearing in KATZ, GOLDSTEIN & DEasHowirz, 687-93.
87. Szasz has recommended the creation of ". .. a corps of lawyers and psychiatrists
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him for therapeutic services would make such a divorce a more prac-
tical possibility.
The separation of custodial responsibility from therapeutic function
would make it possible for professional therapists to commit them-
selves completely to the personal interests and needs of their patients,
and to develop relationships with them untainted by ambivalence
arising from conflicting obligations.88 Physicians would thus be able
to function in the role for which the training and values of their disci-
pline have best fitted them. The isolation of the therapeutic function
would make it easier for the therapist to make recommendations for
treatment, supervision, and release solely in terms of what is in the
patient's interest, rather than in terms of the compromise product of
patient needs and institutional requirements.89 The role of the thera-
pist as agent and advocate of the patient, together with a power in the
patient to select the therapist of his choice, would provide the patient
with a greater degree of control over his institutional fate and might
serve to encourage the development of responsible participation by the
patient in his therapeutic regime.90
Finally, the separation of therapeutic needs from institutional con-
. . . (who) would have a "watch dog" function [i]n the democratic tradition of checks
and balances." They would not be part of the State Mental Hospital System. Hearing on
Constitutional Rights of the Mentally 111, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1961).
88. Conflicts between the therapeutic ideal of the mental health professions and the
custodial actuality tend to create psychological discomfort. Unable to change the actu-
alities, the staff member may leave the institution for another job where such discomfort
can be avoided, or he may change his beliefs and understanding of the institutional
conditions. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY oF COGNrrivE DISSONANCE 1-4. 94-95 (1957). Thus
one effect of the conflict between professional ideals and administrative realities may be
to render administrative personnel less fit psychologically to perform treatment in ac-
cordance with the ideals of their profession. Their psychological need for a mential
callus, desensitizing them to the gap between their professional ideals and the practices
of the institutions they are administering, may explain how the deplorable conditions
in many mental hospitals can continue to exist.
89. Since continued detention may be required for reasons other than therapy, of
course, the therapist cannot have complete power of decision over institutional policies
relating to the disposition and treatment of his patient. Social and institutional values
must also be recognized and provided for. Thus, in some cases, it would seem necessary
for the institution to reject or modify the therapist's proposals for treatment or disposition
of his patients. Such decisions would still have to be made by the institutional official
with ultimate administrative responsibility for the operation and functioning of the in-
stitutions. But this decision, essentially administrative or quasti-judicial in nature, can be
better made where the needs and interests of the patient are unambiguously presented.
90. The patient-centered system, though aware of the patient's weakne.ms, places
emphasis on the more positive features of his personality. He is expected to be an
active participant in his treatment program and, at some point to assume his share
of responsibility for deisions affecting him.
Appleby, Smith, Ellis g- Henry, Institution and Patient Centered Mental Hospitals: A
Comparative Analysis of Polar Types, in THE SocioLoGY OF NTwl.dA DIsomRs 212, 216
(K. Weinberg ed. 1967). See generally R. RuBiNsrEn & H. LAsswau., TiE SHAIUNG o'
PowER IN A PsycHuTaic HOSPITAL (1966).
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siderations would make it possible for more traditional standards of
judicial review of administrative decisions to be applied by courts in
reviewing the appropriateness of institutional decisions concerning
patients2 1 Specifically and most important, decisions on the appropri-
ateness of the release of patient-inmates could be made on the basis of
the recommendations of the therapist-advocate counterbalanced by
the institutional superintendent's concern to protect society from
dangerous persons. Since, in fact, the issues and interests bearing upon
decisions to release or retain are inherently adversarial in nature,02
explicit recognition of this fact would sharpen the decisional process
and make it more responsive to the issues involved.
Given these potential benefits derivable from a system of paying
compensation to those deprived of their liberty by civil restraints,
several important questions remain to be answered.
1. What categories of persons will be entitled to compensation?
2. How will the adequacy of the compensation paid be determined?
3. How will payments be administered, and what will be done with
funds accruing to persons incompetent to handle their own financial
affairs?
Very briefly, it would seem that all persons civilly committed,
whether treatable or not, ought to be entitled to compensation. Per-
haps compensation should be denied to persons committed following
an acquittal by reason of insanity, because of the danger that courts
and juries might tend to reject an insanity defense in order to avoid
compensating the defendant during his incarceration. A better alterna-
tive would be to permit a criminal defendant pleading insanity
to waive his right to compensation for a period of time equal to the
minimum term he would be required to serve if convicted of the crime.
91. Cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1967), suggesting the need
for administrative procedures for considering complaints alleging lack of treatment, and
suggesting the possibility that the absence of "adequate and available" administrative
procedures might be argued to bring into play doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of remedies. But effective administrative procedures would seem to be Im-
possible so long as the needs of the patient and the operational demands of the institu.
tion are not separately evaluated and are not even seen to be at times in conflict.
92. While not all decisions involving treatment and disposition of inmates raise ad-
versarial problems, some do, i.e., those such as the decision to grant privileges or to
release the inmate. The inmate's interest in freedom as soon as he is able to benefit by
it must necessarily be set against the risk that if released he may cause injury to others
and in the process damage the reputation and political position of the institution and
its staff. The comparative risks from detaining an inmate too long as opposed to releasing
him too soon suggest that administrators are likely to be overly cautious. Cf. Schwartz,
et al., quoted in AcTION FOR MENTAL HEA.LTH 174-75; A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE 152-53 (1967). But see Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, supra
note 87 (Guttmacher testimony).
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Apart from this limited category, all persons civilly committed, simply
because their liberty and dignity are being taken for the public benefit,
should receive adequate compensation for such deprivation.
Adequate compensation requires, at a minimum, periodic payments
providing the inmate with funds sufficient to support his dependents,
if any, to purchase amenities and even some luxuries, to pay for psy-
chiatric help and therapy if he is treatable, and to save funds to provide
him with some financial stake upon his release from confinement if he
is cured. The difficult question is whether payments should be uniform
for all those compensated, or whether variable amounts-reflecting
both the special needs and special losses of particular inmates-should
be paid. To the extent that affirmation of the dignity and human worth
of the inmate is the primary purpose of the compensation, uniformity
would seem to be required. Clearly one man's liberty, as such, is worth
as much as any other man's. To the extent that payments are designed
to compensate for the economic deprivations of confinement, however,
a measure such as that employed in wrongful death actions might seem
appropriate. Even if a doctor were not paid the full amount of his lost
income, his family should probably be entitled to receive more than
the slum dweller's would. Perhaps a basic rate of compensation, suffi-
cient to cover the needs of most inmates and their families, could be
made adjustable in special cases to meet unusual costs of treatment or
support of dependents.
Compensation paid to anyone adjudicated an incompetent could
be administered by a commission established by the legislature or a
court appointed guardianship committee required to make periodic
reports to the court and to the guardian or nearest relative of the
inmate. It would seem to be appropriate to give such guardian or rela-
tive standing to challenge dispositions of the funds paid, but in ad-
ministering the fund the primary factor should be the best interests of
the inmate. Of course, if compensation is to be meaningful the
commission or trustee administering the fund must be completely
independent of the administration of the institution to which the indi-
vidual is committed.
The further question arises whether a system of providing com-
pensation to persons who are civilly committed is consistent with
93. A determination of incompetency should not, however, result automatically from
a determination to commit. F. LINDmAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 3. at 228, recommend
that determinations of capadty to handle one's affairs be dissodated from the question
of need for hospital treatment.
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development of the unitary system of preventive and rehabilitative
measures advocated earlier. The danger is that if compensation is
required for civil commitments but not for penal commitments, ad-
ministrators charged with initiating such commitments will wait until
the dangerous person commits an unlawful act and then prosecute for
the crime. Legislatures may also be tempted to recast so-called civil
measures such as juvenile programs and narcotic addiction commit-
ments as penal measures in order to avoid the obligation to provide
compensation.9 4 These possibilities suggest that implementation of a
system of compensation for confinement of the innocently dangerous
must be accompanied by liberalization of current standards of criminal
responsibility so as to accord recognition to degrees of partial inability
to conform one's behavior to the requirements of the law. The courts
must refuse to allow the concept of behavior considered to be beyond
the control of the actor to be narrowed and should make every effort
to move in the opposite direction.
I have suggested that the ideal system of civil restraints would be
one in which personal dignity is maximized by measures administered
in such a way that each person subject to sanction is accorded that
degree of autonomy and responsibility which his capacity for self-
controlled conformity warrants. Since the aim of the law should be to
strengthen the individual's capacity for self-control, we ought to avoid
measures which tend to reward inability to control oneself. Compen-
sating those who lack the ability to control their behavior while deny-
ing compensation to those who can may appear to be inconsistent with
the goal of building self-control. The answer to the dilemma lies not
in denying compensation to the irresponsible but in re-examining our
approach to correction of the responsible.95 The thrust of correctional
procedures applicable to the responsible wrongdoer must be aimed at
building his voluntary adherence to standards of conforming behavior
by building his personal status and self-esteem through a system of
rewards and recognition of his autonomous efforts to adhere to the
94. Of course the principles enunciated in Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962),
would limit resort to penal measures in cases where the only "offense" charged was in
fact a status or condition.
95. In developing the arguments for compensation of persons restrained on preventive
grounds without conviction of crime, I do not mean to suggest that similar requirements
of compensation should not, some day, exist for convicted criminals. Indeed, the notion
of a unitary sanction system would point in that direction as would the growing recognition
that social and environmental factors may impair behavioral controls in persons suffering
from no mental disability. For the present, however, I am content to urge the strongest
case, that those who our society detains for reasons other than their blameworthines are
entitled to compensation for their liberty.
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expectations and requirements of the law.9" Correctional programs
should provide opportunities for useful and responsible labor, and
should pay compensation for such labor proportionate both to the
value of the labor performed and the degree of personal autonomy
which the offender has achieved. In short the deprivation of liberty
and personal status with which penal correction programs begin should
be only a prelude to increased opportunities open to the offender to
win a return of personal status and liberty by his own efforts at self-
rehabilitation. In the context of such treatment of the responsible,
compensation provided to the non-responsible would appear not as a
reward for irresponsibility, but as true compensation for liberty taken
from individuals not yet ready to earn a return of personal status and
social esteem.97
Two final, and fundamental, difficulties with the proposals suggested
must now be confronted. The first is the economic cost of an adequate
system of compensation; the second is the role of the courts in imposing
96. Cf. the recommendations of the Pm~sENT's CoarsSsioN ON LAW E.FONronccmTr Arm
ADMNISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FoRC REPORTS: CORRECTIONS 9-13, 49-50 (1967).
97. Bail and the problem of pre-trial detention, although conceptually distinct from
the various forms of civil detention focused upon in this article, is a striking example of
an important deprivation of liberty which could and should be revolutionized by the
creative use of correctional tools. In particular the false choice between complete release
and complete detention which bail seems to pose should be reexamined in light of pos-
sibilities for partial restraints. There is no inherent reason why release on bail or reco4-
nizance must lead to a complete hiatus in official response to an offender until he is
tried and convicted. Such hiatus is a major factor in recidivism pending trial, since the
very motivational and causative factors which led to the first crime may still be operating
when the defendant is released promptly after arrest. And a means to break this causation
seems to me available through the strategic use of correctional and defense personnel.
When a person is arrested on a serious criminal charge, he should be provided not just
with the assistance of counsel but with the assistance of a defense team: an attorney, a
defense probation worker, and, where it seems appropriate to the defense attorney, the
aid of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. The defense team would consult with the
defendant and develop a program of pre-trial probation, to be submitted to the trial
court for approval, which would serve to keep the defendant out of trouble pending
trial and which could become a demonstration of the defendant's rehabilitation poten-
tial. The defendant's obvious stake in making the program work so as to influence sen.
tenting and correctional decisions if he is convicted should operate as a powerful
motivating factor to keep him from committing further offenses. It must be conceded,
however, that in some cases the defendant's record and the circumstances of the crime
will suggest that he is not a fit candidate for pre-trial release. Certainly where the cir-
cumstances or the defendant's record suggest that he is suffering from a disability in the
capacity to control his behavior, prompt commitment for evaluation or merely for de-
tention would be appropriate. But in such cases, I would require the recognition that the
detention is preventive and would require compensation and detention under conditions
different from those to which convicted offenders are subjected. In cases where the
defendant is not shown to be suffering from a disability impairing his capacity to conform
to the law in the future, pretrial preventive detention Should not be used as a basis for
denying bail to those who are currently entitled to it.
For discussion of the problems of pre-trial detention, see generally A.%nucAN BAn
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMt STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (1968); lote, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HA/v. L. R-v.
1489 (1966).
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this cost. To begin with the second, it must be conceded that there is
no precedent specifically authorizing-much less requiring-the courts
to compel payment of compensation as a condition for the imposition
of civil detention. 9s Nor is it enough simply to assert that compensation
ought to be required, and that the courts should impose it because
legislatures will not. The courts are hardly likely to take such a step
in any immediate future. The answer instead must be that the require-
ment of compensation should be imposed by the courts rather than the
legislatures because compensation as a requirement for the taking of
liberty is inherently a judicial remedy. The function of compensation
would be in large part a symbolic allocation of relative status between
the ... state and the individual. Compensation judicially imposed on
constitutional grounds would enhance individual liberty and rights of
personality in a manner which could not be achieved by an exercise of
legislative discretion. What is involved is the relationship of individual
autonomy to state necessity, and recent history suggests that the courts
are more appropriate arbiters of such conflicts than the legislatures.
Once a right to compensation had been recognized, its implementation
could properly be left to legislatures to fix specific procedures for
compensation.
As to the cost, obviously what has been proposed would be extremely
expensive. Yet in another sense compensation involves not additional
costs for civil commitment but a reallocation of costs which are already
being borne. For loss of liberty is costly to the loser in many ways, eco-
nomic as well as intangible. Transferring the economic costs from the
inmate and his family to society as a whole is just a shift in costs rather
than an increase. The advantage of such a shift is that it makes the
actual costs more visible, and by placing the costs on those whose repre-
sentatives make the decision to impose them, renders it more likely
that there will be an appropriate weighing of the social utility to be
achieved in imposing such costs. So far as the translation of the intan-
gible values of liberty into monetary terms is concerned, this too is
worth doing if, in the process, we derive a sufficient social benefit from
the translation. I have attempted to show that this would be the case,
both in terms of better treatment and in maximizing the intangible
98. But cf. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968), in which
the court awarded damages in the amount of $300,000 to a claimant who had been de.
tained in Matteawan State Hospital. The court found that failure to provide adequate
treatment had extended his confinement by some 12 years beyond the period in whichhe would have been cured and thus eligible for release if proper treatment had been
provided.
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values implicit in our ideological commitment to the importance of
individual freedom and dignity. Perhaps the ultimate answer to the
question whether we can afford compensation was given by the Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health in discussing the high cost
of improving the treatment of the mentally ill:
An economy can afford to spend whatever it desires to spend.
What society can spend (and ultimately what society should spend)
depends on the value system that society holds.90
Noting that its recommendations called for doubling or tripling ex-
penditures for mental health, the Commission concluded:
[I]t is individually and socially important to us that as many per-
sons as possible survive in good health as long as possible and that
if they fall sick, we make every effort to restore their health. In
the confidence that this is so, the healthy find a sense of security
and peace of mind. We are speaking in short of faith in our fellow
men. In conserving useful life, civilized man achieves his most
glorious moments. It is our creed that life is sacred, that bodies
should be healed when sick, and that law violators should have the
opportunity to reform. Every living man has a right to be treated
as a human being. 00
99. R. Fin, EcoNoM ls OF MENTAL ILLNESS 137 (1958), quoted in AcrnoN roR MENTAL
HEALTH 282.
100. ON Fr MENTAL HEALTH 283.
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